Power Posing: P-Curving the Evidence by Simmons, Joseph P & Simonsohn, Uri
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2017
Power Posing: P-Curving the Evidence
Joseph P. Simmons
University of Pennsylvania
Uri Simonsohn
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Social and Behavioral
Sciences Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/76
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Simmons, J. P., & Simonsohn, U. (2017). Power Posing: P-Curving the Evidence. Psychological Science, 28 (5), 687-693.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797616658563
Power Posing: P-Curving the Evidence
Abstract
In a well-known article, Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2010) documented the benefits of “power posing”. In their
study, participants (N=42) who were randomly assigned to briefly adopt expansive, powerful postures sought
more risk, had higher testosterone levels, and had lower cortisol levels than those assigned to adopt
contractive, powerless postures. In their response to a failed replication by Ranehill et al. (2015), Carney,
Cuddy, and Yap (2015) reviewed 33 successful studies investigating the effects of expansive vs. contractive
posing, focusing on differences between these studies and the failed replication, to identify possible
moderators that future studies could explore. But before spending valuable resources on that, it is useful to
establish whether the literature that Carney et al. (2015) cited actually suggests that power posing is effective.
In this paper we rely on p-curve analysis to answer the following question: Does the literature reviewed by
Carney et al. (2015) suggest the existence of an effect once we account for selective reporting? We conclude
not. The distribution of p-values from those 33 studies is indistinguishable from what is expected if (1) the
average effect size were zero, and (2) selective reporting (of studies and/or analyses) were solely responsible
for the significant effects that are published. Although more highly powered future research may find
replicable evidence for the purported benefits of power posing (or unexpected detriments), the existing
evidence is too weak to justify a search for moderators or to advocate for people to engage in power posing to
better their lives.
Disciplines
Finance and Financial Management | Social and Behavioral Sciences
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/76
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797616658563
Psychological Science
2017, Vol. 28(5) 687 –693
© The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions: 
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10 1177/09567 7616 58563
www.psychologicalscience.org/PS
Commentary
In a well-known article, Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2010) 
documented the benefits of power posing. In their study, 
participants (N = 42) who were randomly assigned to briefly 
adopt expansive, powerful postures sought more risk, had 
higher testosterone levels, and had lower cortisol levels than 
those randomly assigned to adopt contractive, powerless 
postures. This result has led some individuals to recom-
mend power posing as a way to improve performance and 
life outcomes (e.g., Blodget, 2013; Cuddy, 2012).
Despite the attention Carney et al.’s (2010) study has 
received, there had until recently been no attempts to 
closely replicate its methods. Ranehill et al. (2015), using 
a larger sample (N = 200) and similar but not identical 
procedures, found that although adopting powerful pos-
tures led to self-reported increases in feelings of power 
(thus verifying the effectiveness of Carney et al.’s manip-
ulation), it did not affect participants’ behavior or hor-
monal levels.1
In their response to the failed replication, Carney, 
Cuddy, and Yap (2015) reviewed 33 successful studies 
investigating the effects of expansive versus contractive 
posing, focusing on differences between these studies 
and the failed replication to identify possible moderators 
that future studies could explore. But before spending 
valuable resources on that, it is useful to establish whether 
the literature that Carney et al. (2015) cited actually sug-
gests that power posing is effective.
It may seem that the existence of 33 supportive pub-
lished studies is enough to conclude that there is an effect 
of expansive versus contractive posture on psychological 
outcomes. However, one needs to account for selective 
reporting. If results get published only when they show an 
effect, the fact that all the published evidence shows an 
effect is not diagnostic (see, e.g., Pashler & Harris, 2012).
In this Commentary, we rely on p-curve analysis to 
answer the following question: Does the literature 
reviewed by Carney et al. (2015) suggest the existence of 
an effect once one accounts for selective reporting? We 
conclude that it does not. The distribution of p values from 
those 33 studies is indistinguishable from what would be 
expected if (a) the average effect size were zero and (b) 
selective reporting (of studies or analyses) were solely 
responsible for the significant effects that were published.
Our results do not imply, nor could they imply, that the 
effect size examined in these studies is exactly zero. It is 
possible that it is undetectably small in the predicted direc-
tion, say r = .03, or in the unpredicted direction, say r = 
−.03. But p-curve’s estimates are precise enough to allow 
one to reject effects that would have been detectable in 
the power-posing studies cited by Carney et al. (2015). 
Thus, what the results do imply is that direct replications 
of these studies would not be expected to succeed.
The next three sections give an overview of selective 
reporting and p-curve analyses. Readers familiar with 
these topics may safely skip ahead to the Results section.
Selective Reporting
Statistically significant results are more likely to be pub-
lished than results that are not significant (Greenwald, 
1975; Rosenthal, 1979; Sterling, 1959; Sterling, Rosenbaum, 
& Weinkam, 1995). Selective reporting comes in at least 
two forms. One form, file-drawering (Rosenthal, 1979), 
involves the selective reporting of individual studies that 
are statistically significant. For example, a researcher may 
run five studies investigating the same effect but then only 
report the one study that achieved statistical significance, 
keeping the remaining four in the file drawer. (Or equiva-
lently, five researchers may each run one study, but only 
the researcher who obtains a p < .05 publishes it.)
The other form of selective reporting is known as 
p-hacking (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014a), 
which consists of conducting alternative analyses on the 
same data set and then selectively reporting those that 
provide statistically significant support for a publishable 
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claim. For example, researchers may attempt to control 
for different variables, to exclude participants they had 
previously included, to log-transform the dependent vari-
able, to analyze a few more (or fewer) participants than 
planned, etc., until reaching a p < .05 (Simmons, Nelson, 
& Simonsohn, 2011).
Both forms of selective reporting threaten the validity 
of the published literature by hiding from view unsup-
portive (nonsignificant) results. This leads one to mistak-
enly conclude that an effect is larger than it actually is, or 
even that an effect is real when it actually is not.
A variety of statistical techniques exist to determine 
whether selective reporting is present in a literature (Egger, 
Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 
2007; Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005). These tools 
can be used to answer the question, are there some studies 
or results we are not observing in this literature? (Francis, 
2014; Ioannidis, 2011; Schimmack, 2012). However, they 
cannot be used to answer what is, in our view, the more 
important question: Once one accounts for selective report-
ing, do the observed results suggest that the effect is real? 
Answering this question requires correcting for selective 
reporting rather than just diagnosing its existence.
The most common approach to correcting for selec-
tive reporting is the trim-and-fill procedure (Duval & 
Tweedie, 2000). Unfortunately, it performs very poorly, 
often leaving estimates nearly as biased as the uncor-
rected estimates were. For example, Simonsohn, Nelson, 
and Simmons (2014b, Fig. 2) showed that when a nonex-
istent effect (Cohen’s d = 0) is studied with predeter-
mined per-cell sample sizes between 5 and 35 (and there 
is no p-hacking), the average statistically significant esti-
mate is d̂ = 0.72. The trim-and-fill procedure lowers that 
estimate only to d̂ = 0.70. A less well-known method is 
PET-PEESE (precision-effect test and precision-effect esti-
mate with standard error; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). 
It too performs poorly. For example, Gervais (2015) sim-
ulated a literature in which half the studies investigated a 
true effect size of d = 0.40 and half investigated a true 
effect size of d = 0.80. PET-PEESE estimated the true 
effect to be zero.2 In our view, the use of these methods 
should be discontinued.
P-Curve Analysis
In Simonsohn et al. (2014a), we introduced p-curve anal-
ysis, a statistical tool that tests whether a set of findings 
contains evidential value. A set of findings contains evi-
dential value if one can statistically rule out that selective 
reporting was solely responsible for the statistically sig-
nificant results that have been observed. P-curve analysis 
can also be used to obtain a selective-reporting-corrected 
estimate of the average statistical power of a set of stud-
ies (Simonsohn et al., 2014b).
P-curve is the observed distribution of statistically sig-
nificant p values testing the hypothesis of interest from a 
set of studies (i.e., ps ≤ .05). Its shape is diagnostic of 
evidential value.
In the absence of p-hacking, we expect studies investi-
gating a nonexistent (i.e., zero) effect to result in a flat 
(uniform) p-curve. To understand why, consider that 
when the null hypothesis is true, there is a 5% chance of 
observing a p < .05, a 4% chance of observing a p < .04, a 
3% chance of observing a p < .03, and so on. This means 
there is a 1% chance of observing a p < .01, a 1% chance 
of observing a p value between .01 and .02, a 1% chance 
of observing a p value between .02 and .03, and so on.
This is what would be expected if the effect were zero 
in all studies and if p-hacking were absent from all stud-
ies. When p-curve analysis includes some effects that 
exist (i.e., some nonzero effects), p-curve is expected to 
be right-skewed, with more low significant p values (e.g., 
.01s) than high significant p values (e.g., .04s). Thus, if at 
least some of the studies in a literature are actually inves-
tigating a true effect, then more of the critical p values 
will be very significant (e.g., .01s) rather than barely sig-
nificant (e.g., .04s). For example, if one conducts p-curve 
analysis on a literature in which half of the studies with 
statistically significant findings investigated truly existent 
effects (studied with 80% power), and the other half 
investigated truly nonexistent effects, the resulting 
p-curve would be expected to have about four times as 
many p values below .01 as between .04 and .05 (also see 
Cumming, 2008; Hung, O’Neill, Bauer, & Kohne, 1997; 
Wallis, 1942).3
Some kinds of p-hacking, the selective reporting of 
analyses conducted on the same data set, are analogous 
to file-drawering, to selectively reporting studies (e.g., 
reporting results only for men or only for women). Thus, 
when a studied effect does not exist, these kinds of 
p-hacking are equally likely to result in low significant 
p values (e.g., .01s) and high significant p values (e.g., 
.04s). In contrast, other kinds of p-hacking are dispropor-
tionately more likely to result in high significant p values 
(e.g., .04s) than in low significant p values (e.g., .01s). 
Thus, p-hacking generally makes p-curves flatter (i.e., 
less right-skewed) and possibly left-skewed.4
When it comes to concluding that a literature lacks 
evidential value, p-curve analysis is conservative; it 
occasionally results in right-skewed p-curves even in 
the absence of an effect. As discussed in Simonsohn, 
Simmons, and Nelson (2015), this can occur if the find-
ings are misreported or fraudulent, or if researchers 
choose the smallest possible p value from a large set of 
analyses (Ulrich & Miller, 2015). Simonsohn et al., (2015) 
recently revised the p-curve procedure to be more robust 
to these circumstances.
Inferences From Observed P-Curves
P-curve analysis involves two tests, one examining 
whether p-curve’s shape is significantly right-skewed 
P-Curving the Power-Posing Literature 689
and one examining whether p-curve is significantly flat. 
The second test requires some explanation. In the same 
way that statistical inference cannot establish that two pop-
ulation means are exactly the same, one cannot establish 
that a distribution is exactly flat (i.e., that the “population” 
frequency of ps = .01 is exactly the same as the frequency 
of ps = .04). To circumvent this problem, one can rely on 
the fact that how right-skewed a p-curve is expected to be 
depends on the statistical power of the underlying studies. 
Studies with greater power yield steeper right-skewed 
p-curves (see Simonsohn et al., 2014a, 2014b). To test 
whether p-curve is flat, p-curve analysis tests whether 
p-curve is significantly less right-skewed than one would 
expect if the studies were so underpowered as to be able 
to detect a true effect only 33% of the time.5 Thus, although 
one cannot establish whether p-curve is flat, one can 
establish whether it is significantly flatter than would be 
expected if the studies had 33% power.
This test provides protection against underpowered 
p-curves. When too few studies are used for p-curve anal-
ysis, the results will be inconclusive, neither significantly 
right-skewed nor significantly flat.
Results
Using the online p-curve app (http://www.p-curve.com), 
we analyzed the 33 studies that Carney et al. (2015) cited 
as evidence for the effectiveness of power posing (visit 
https://osf.io/ujpyn for our p-curve disclosure table and 
archived copy of R code used by the app). We had to 
exclude two studies because they investigated only feel-
ings of power (the manipulation check) rather than down-
stream effects of the postural manipulations. We excluded 
two further studies because the critical test statistics were 
unreported. In addition, our p-curve analysis necessarily 
(and automatically) excluded seven p values because they 
were nonsignificant. Studies in which 2 × 2 reversing 
interactions were hypothesized require researchers using 
p-curve analysis to enter p values from each simple effect 
and thus to include two p values rather than one. For two 
studies in this sample, p-curve analysis automatically 
excluded one simple effect (because it was nonsignifi-
cant) but retained the other. Thus, we ultimately excluded 
11 p values from 9 studies from the analysis, giving us a 
final sample size of 24 p values from 24 studies (33 – 9 = 
24). The resulting p-curve is shown in Figure 1.
Note: The observed p-curve includes 24 statistically significant ( p < .05) results, of which 10 
are p < .025. There were 7 additional results entered but excluded from p-curve because they 
were p > .05.
Fig. 1. P-curve of the 33 studies cited by Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2015) as evidence 
for the effects of power posing on downstream outcomes. The solid line shows the dis-
tribution of critical p values. It shows, for example, that 25% of the statistically significant 
p values were between .04 and .05, and that 33% were between .02 and .03. The key 
gives the 90% confidence interval (CI) for the estimate of the average power of the stud-
ies graphed. The dotted line shows the expected distribution of p values if there were 
truly no effect, and the dashed line shows the expected distribution of p values if the 
effect existed and the existing studies were powered at 33%. This figure was generated 
by p-curve app 4.05. 
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We first determined whether evidential value was 
present. As explained in Simonsohn et al. (2015), we 
conclude that a literature contains evidential value if 
either the half p-curve (which analyzes only critical p 
values below .025) is significantly right-skewed at the 5% 
level, or if both the half and full p-curve are significantly 
right skewed at the 10% level. Neither condition was met 
here (half: z = −1.24, p = .11; full: z = 0.32, p = .63).
We then compared the observed p-curve with what 
would be expected when studies have an average power 
of only 33%. One can conclude that there is an absence 
of evidential value if the full p-curve is significantly flatter 
than the 33%-power p-curve at p < .05.6 This condition 
was met (full: z = −2.95, p = .0016), which allowed us to 
conclusively reject the null hypothesis that the sample of 
existing studies examines a detectable effect.
Finally, one can use p-curve analysis to estimate the 
average power of these studies. It is only 5%, which is the 
“power” we expect when the true effect size is zero and 
the significance threshold is .05 (since 5% of null effects 
will be significant at a threshold of .05). The 90% confi-
dence interval around this estimate is narrow, excluding 
levels of average power greater than 14%. If the same 
studies were run again, it is unlikely that more than 14% 
of them would replicate, and our best guess is that 5% of 
them would be significant (in any direction).
Additional Analyses
Simonsohn et al. (2014a) provided detailed guidelines for 
selecting test results from studies. Because we followed 
those guidelines here, there was minimal ambiguity as to 
which test to select from each study. Moreover, we con-
ducted a “robustness” p-curve that included 12 valid 
alternative p-value selections. The results from this analy-
sis were very similar to the results reported in the previ-
ous section: The test for evidential value was nonsignificant 
(full: p = .60, half: p = .53), and the p-curve was signifi-
cantly flatter than if the studies were powered at 33% on 
average (full: p = .0031); the estimate of average power 
was still 5%, with a 90% confidence interval excluding 
values greater than 17% (rather than 14%). Because Rane-
hill et al.’s replication obtained a significant effect of 
power posing on the manipulation check, self-reported 
power, we constructed a separate p-curve including only 
the seven manipulation-check results. The resulting 
p-curve was directionally right-skewed (full: p = .051, 
half: p = .184). Our p-curve disclosure table (http://osf 
.io/2fq9c) includes all p-value selections (and justifica-
tions), as well as everything the reader needs to easily 
evaluate and reproduce our analyses.
Power of P-Curve
The conclusion that this literature lacks evidential value 
cannot be explained (or explained away) by our p-curve 
analysis’s lack of power. With 24 p values, our p-curve 
analysis has vastly more power than the underlying stud-
ies do. For example, if the 24 studies investigating expan-
sive versus contractive posing had 33% power on average, 
then the resulting p-curve would have an 89% chance 
to detect evidential value. If the 24 studies had 50% 
power on average, then the resulting p-curve would have 
99% power to detect evidential value. If 14 studies exam-
ined null effects, and 10 examined real effects, a p-curve 
based on all 24 would have more power than those 10 
studies do on average (R code for these calibrations can 
be found at https://osf.io/sdgkq/). Moreover, Figure 2 
shows that the results do not at all hinge on a few extreme 
observations.
Set of Studies
Like all statistical analyses, p-curve analyses provide 
information only about the sampled populations. The 
sample of studies we analyzed consists of what Carney 
et al. (2015) described as “all published tests (to our 
knowledge) of expansive (vs. contractive) posture on 
psychological outcomes” (p. 657). Thus, our conclusions 
apply only to all studies on the effects of expansive ver-
sus contractive posing that were known to Carney et al. 
in 2015. One reviewer criticized our focus on this set of 
studies, believing it to be arbitrary and subjective. Thus, 
it seems worthwhile to explain it.
Carney et al.’s (2015) response to the failed replication 
of their work was to say that 33 other studies provided 
evidence for their effects. Our goal in this commentary 
was to examine whether that sample of studies contains 
evidential value.
Given this objective, our set of studies was chosen for 
us, not by us. Moreover, given that this sample was not 
selected by Carney et al. (2015) for the purpose of con-
ducting a p-curve analysis, it seems implausible that the 
selection of studies was guided, either implicitly or explic-
itly, by how large or small the critical p values were. Thus, 
this sample is both valid—it is by definition the population 
of interest to us—and unbiased—it was not selected by 
researchers interested in using p-curves to draw a particu-
lar conclusion. It is difficult to imagine a less arbitrary or 
subjective way to choose a sample of studies to analyze.7
Conclusion
Taken together, the results from Ranehill et al.’s (2015) 
replication and from our p-curve analysis suggest that the 
behavioral and physiological effects of expansive versus 
contractive postures ought to be treated as hypotheses 
currently lacking in empirical support. Although more 
highly powered future research may find replicable evi-
dence for those benefits (or unexpected detriments), the 
existing evidence is too weak to justify a search for 
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moderators or to advocate for people to engage in power 
posing to better their lives.
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Fig. 2. Effect of dropping the lowest and highest p values on the significance of the full p-curve test for right-skewness (top row), the half p-curve test 
for right-skewness (middle row), and the test for flatness relative to 33% power (bottom row). Within each graph, the red horizontal line demarcates 
the significance threshold (p = .05), and the filled marker is the result reported in the text. This figure was generated by p-curve app 4.05. 
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97616658563. This article has received the badge for Open Data. 
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Notes
1. In a more recent article (Cuddy, Wilmuth, Yap, & Carney, 
2015), the original authors state that they consider self-reported 
feelings of power to be a manipulation check rather than an 
outcome, writing that “as a manipulation check, participants 
reported how dominant, in control, in charge, powerful, and 
like a leader they felt on a 5-point scale” (p. 1289). Moreover, 
the effects of postural manipulations on self-reported feelings 
of power are susceptible to demand effects. For example, if an 
experimenter asks participants to slouch for 2 min and then to 
rate how powerful they feel, participants may assume that the 
experimenter expects them to feel relatively powerless or may 
instead answer the question, “How powerful is the pose you 
just assumed?”
2. Our own simulations show that, in general, PET-PEESE esti-
mates are virtually nondiagnostic of true effect size.
3. When studies have 80% power to detect an effect, about 72% 
of significant results are expected to have a p < .01 and only 
4% to have a p > .04 (see Fig. 1 in Simonsohn et al., 2014a). 
Averaging each of these percentages with 20%, which is what 
is expected under the null hypothesis, one sees that 47% of 
significant p values would be expected to be below .01 and that 
12% would be expected to be between .04 and .05.
4. The effect of p-hacking on p-curve’s shape hinges on whether 
the p-hacked analyses are correlated with each other. When the 
analyses are uncorrelated with each other, then p-hacking will 
do the same thing to p-curve as file-drawering does (i.e., it will 
make p-curve flat under the null hypothesis). When the analy-
ses are correlated with each other, then p-hacking is more likely 
to result in significant p values that are closer to .05 than to .01 
(Simonsohn et al., 2014a, 2014b). See Supplement 3, “Modeling 
p-hacking,” in Simonsohn et al. (2014a) for a formal analysis of 
this distinction.
5. Like all cutoffs, the 33%-power cutoff is necessarily arbitrary. 
Simonsohn et al. (2014a) chose it because it is a very low level 
of power, as a study with 33% power would be twice as likely 
to fail as to succeed. Because cutoffs are arbitrary, they should 
be used as reference points rather than as meaningful categori-
cal divides. In the case of p-curve analysis, the more strongly 
one rejects the null hypothesis that the study has 33% power, 
the more inconsistent the evidence is with the existence of the 
hypothesized effect.
6. This test is also significant if both the binomial and the full 
p-curve are flatter at p < .10.
7. The reviewer identified seven additional studies that Carney 
et al. (2015) did not include in their review. The editor sug-
gested we update our analysis by including the studies that 
were published since Carney et al.’s review. Only two of the 
seven studies mentioned by the reviewer potentially met 
this criterion, and neither one of them actually investigated 
the effects of expansive versus contractive postures. Leitan, 
Williams, and Murray (2015) manipulated whether people tilted 
their heads up and down (a manipulation Carney et al. explic-
itly chose to exclude; see the note in their Table 1). Michalak, 
Rohde, and Troje (2015) manipulated whether people walked 
on a treadmill in a happy versus depressed pattern. This is a 
good opportunity to emphasize a critical point about the use 
of p-curves: The rule guiding the selection of studies must be 
set in advance and be disclosed to protect against the cherry-
picking of studies. The reviewer not only suggested studies that 
do not belong in the analysis, but also did not disclose an a 
priori study-selection rule.
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